however, that Byron's opinion in an earlier case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 5 had a significant impact on Potter's appraisal of a constitutional issue of profound importance-the doctrine of substantive due process-in later cases. The basic issue raised in Griswold was whether the Federal Constitution contains a substantive constraint on a state's power to prohibit the use of contraceptives by married couples. 6 Connecticut's answer to that question was succinctly stated in its brief on the merits:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the General Assembly of Connecticut that the use of contraceptives should be banned is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. 7 By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejected that submission, relying on three quite different rationales: a right to marital privacy created by the "penumbras" emanating from various parts of the Bill of Rights, 8 a right to marital privacy protected by the Ninth Amendment, 9 and the substantive content of the Due Process Clause itself.' 0 Justice Stewart's dissent, like Justice Black's,' rejected all three rationales,1 2 viewing the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause as extending only to a guarantee against vague statutes and procedural unfairness.
1 3 While Justice White also rejected the first two rationales advanced in support of the Court's holding, he, like Justice Harlan, 14 concurred in the Court's judgment. 15 In doing so, Justice White relied squarely on the proposition that the Clause itself protects a realm of personal liberty that the state may not regulate without substantial justification. 6 In Roe v. Wade, 17 a later case involving the constitutionality of a Texas statute prohibiting abortions, which was also decided by a 7-2 vote, the roles of Justices Stewart and White were reversed. Of the four opinions supporting the Court's judgment, it was Justice Stewart's that Stevens unambiguously relied on the doctrine of substantive due process.' 8 Potter began by recognizing, as he had already done earlier in Griswold, 19 that Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa 20 had "purported to sound the death knell for the doctrine of substantive due process., 2 1 Despite this supposed death knell, Potter argued that "the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", 22 Potter supported this statement with citations to Justice White's opinion in Griswold, and to the series of cases on which Justice White had relied in that opinion. In his dissent, Byron did not disavow those cases, although he obviously construed them more narrowly than Potter did. 24 Potter and Byron again disagreed with one another about the proper analysis of the next substantive due process issue to confront the Court after Roe, but this time it was Potter who took the narrower view. Moore v. City of East Cleveland involved the validity of an ordinance that permitted a grandmother to share her home with two grandchildren if they were brothers but not if they were cousins. 25 The net result of the six opinions analyzing the 26 issue was a judgment invalidating the ordinance. Potter and Byron both dissented, but for quite different reasons. In Potter's view, no constitutionally protected interest in liberty had been infringed, 27 whereas Byron refused to give the term "liberty" such a "crabbed construction.
' " 2 8 In Byron's opinion, the infringing legislation was sufficiently justified by the city's interest in limiting the number of people who can occupy a single-family residence.
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Cases like Griswold, Roe, and Moore illustrate the inevitability of disagreement among independent and thoughtful judges charged with the task of interpreting broad language in the constitutional text. Students of those opinions sometimes infer that such disagreements are partly due to personal friction or disrespect. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, I have often thought that Tranio's reference to litigating advocates applies with equally full force to members of 
